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¶1

¶2

Tragically, by now “the genocide in slow motion” in Darfur has become too
familiar. For some time the United Nations has labeled the situation in Darfur as
“the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.” It is man made. It is horrific. It is
preventable. Yet the carnage continues while the international community engages
in political posturing and diplomatic half- measures. It’s a disgrace. The echoes of
this failure will long linger in the hallways of history. This mayhem and
destruction must end.
Professor Benjamin Valentino of Dartmouth College has written an important
book, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century.1 He finds
that:
ethnic hatreds or discrimination, undemocratic systems of government,
and dysfunctions in society play a much smaller role in mass killing and
genocide than is commonly assumed. He shows that the impetus for mass
killing usually originates from a relatively small group of powerful leaders
and is often carried out without the active support of broader society.
Mass killing, in his view, is a brutal political or military strategy designed
to accomplish leaders’ most important objectives, counter threats to their
power, and solve their most difficult problems.

The events in Darfur fit within that analysis.
¶3 Sudan sits on the ancient crossroads between Arab North Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa. For countless generations, the Arabs of the north and the blacks of the
south lived in peace, intermingling and intermarrying. Historically, Sudan was a
mosaic of different tribes with various languages and many religions. More than
150 native languages are spoken in Sudan today, including 20 in the Darfur region.
Then during its colonial rule, the British “used tribal identities to divide their
subjects” as a means to keep control of this vast country. 2
1

ROBERT A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE IN THE 20TH
CENTURY (2004).
2
MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: FROM THE HOPES OF FREEDOM TO THE
HEART OF DESPAIR (2005).
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As the British prepared to leave, they began to hand control over to the northern
Muslims. This engendered concern and resentment. Clashes between portions of
the south and the north began in August, 1955, and continued after the British left
in 1956.
From 1958 to 1972, and from 1983 until today there has been fighting in Sudan. 3
The fighting has been about natural resources, religion, efforts for regions to gain a
measure of autonomy, and so forth.
In 2003, while Khartoum still was consumed with fighting the rebellion in the
south, two insurgencies from the “African” agriculturalists engaged in a series of
raids and skirmishes killing several hundred government troops. 4 Awful as these
casualties were, this small rebel movement posed no serious threat to Khartoum’s
rule. However, reluctant to divert soldiers from the south, Khartoum opened the
gates of hell.
Rather than reply with a targeted response directed at a few members of the
incipient rebellion, Khartoum armed a militia in Darfur. 5 More tha n 20,000
highwaymen and bandits, drawn from impoverished nomadic Arab groups in
Darfur and Chad, were armed. These militia, known as the Janjaweed, were
unleashed to wage a systematic campaign of destruction against African civilians in
the area belonging to the same non-Arab ethnic groups as the rebels: the Fur,
Masaabit and Zaghawa. 6 One commentator has written that “the Sudanese
government ’s tactic seems to have been straight from the Maoist theory book. By
destroying African villages, the army and their Arab militia allies drained the sea
the rebels swam in.”7
Often the attacks begin with government aerial bombardment of civilians – mainly
using Antonov supply planes dropping lethal barrel bombs filled with metal shards,
sometimes using helicopter gunships or MIG jet fighters. 8 After the aerial attacks,
Janjaweed riding camels and on horseback sweep into villages. They burn huts,
destroy crops, slaughter or steal livestock, poison wells, and rape and brand women.
African males, infants, boys, men, and elderly, are sometimes butchered. NonArab Sudanese are systematically expelled from their homes.
The overwhelming majority of the men, women and children victimized by these
merciless atrocities bear no relation whatsoever to the insurgents. Their crime is
ethnicity. They are non-Arab and they are defenseless.

3

For an excellent description of Darfur’s geography, history and ethnography see GERARD PRUNIER,
DARFUR: THE AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE 1-80 (2005).
4
The two rebel groups were the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM).
5
Khartoum had similarly enlisted militia supported by the Sudanese military to attack incipient rebellion
in Bahr el Ghazal in 1986-88, in the Nuba Mountains in 1992-95 and in the Upper Nile in 1998-2003.
6
For a more detailed discussion of the Janjaweed, see JULIE FLINT AND ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR:
A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 33-65 (2005).
7
Mark Doyle, Darfur Misery Has Complex Roots, BBC NEWS , Sept. 9, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3692346.stm.
8
The close coordination between the Sudanes e Government in Khartoum and the Janjaweed militia is
well documented. See, e.g., Koert Lindijer, Analysis: Reining in the Militia, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3594520.stm.
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¶10 Terrible crimes have been committed. Innocent people have suffered and many
continue to perish. The ethnic cleansing has risen to horrific levels. 9
¶11 The ethnic pattern of these atrocities is clear. A United Nations observer team
reported that non-Arab black villages were attacked while Arab villages were
untouched. 10
¶12 Two and a half years ago, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned of “ethnic
cleansing” in Darfur and called on the international community to act. 11 Two years
ago, then Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled the ongoing atrocities in Darfur
“genocide.”12 Meanwhile, the violent atrocities continue and the world’s response
has been modest.
¶13 In Darfur, up to 400,000 people have died. Over 2.5 million people have been
driven from their homes and live in desperate conditions in IDP and refugee camps.
The Janjaweed even stalk those camps, sometimes killing males or raping women
and girls who venture out to gather firewood.
¶14 Canadian General Romeo Dallaire was force commander of the UN Assistance
Mission for Rwanda. He writes of these turbulent times in his book Shake Hands
With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. “What happened in Rwanda
in 1994 [is] a story of betrayal, failure, naiveté, indifference, hatred, genocide, war,
inhumanity and evil….The Rwandan story is the story of the failure of humanity to
heed a call for help from an endangered people.”13
¶15 In Darfur, evil again stalks the earth. A desperate call for help has been made. But
despite the humanitarian aid and the diplomatic posturing, humanity is failing to
heed the call. The violence continues, the victims suffer, and the international
community vacillates. It is well past the time when robust action should have been
taken to end this crisis.
¶16 As Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel told the UN Security Council last month, “Passivity
helps the oppressor and not the oppressed.” Wiesel went on to urge the Security
Council members to remember the Rwandan genocide. “I do,” he said. “Eight
hundred thousand human beings were murdered. We know then as we know now
they could have been saved, and they were not.”14
¶17 However, action to stop the killing in Darfur is not the same as continuing the
delicate diplomatic minuet on Darfur. Treaties have been signed and they have
9

See, e.g., John Prendergast, Sudan’s Ravines of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004 at A23.
See generally Darfur Conflict, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darfur_conflict. See also, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND
MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN, (2004), http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/; the World
Medical Association, Genocide Unfolding in Sudan, http://www.wma.net/e/humanrights/phr.htm.
11
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Remarks at the Day of Remembrance of the 10th Anniversary of the
Genocide in Rwanda,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlantoPreventGenocide7Apr2004.htm
.
12
Colum Lynch, US Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide: Khartoum and Arab Militias Are Responsible,
Powell says, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at A1.
13
ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN
RWANDA, at xvii, 516 (2003).
14
Evelyn Leopold, Clooney, Wiesel tell UN Time Running Out in Darfur, REUTERS, Sept. 9, 2006,
available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/2/story.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10401455. Darfur certainly
is not unique in having a gap between the principle and practice of human rights. See, e.g., TODD
LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2005).
10
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been violated. Most recently a peace agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria last
May, between Khartoum and the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Army. 15
Like earlier agreements, this one has not translated into a safer, more secure
environment on the ground. And the United Nations Security Council also has
passed a series of resolutions on Darfur : condemning the mayhem, calling for
humanitarian aid, even calling for the deployment of UN Peacekeepers. 16 But these
resolutions have been only so much sound and fury amounting to naught.
Khartoum has not accepted the deployment of UN Peacekeepers and only
reluctantly tolerates the presence of African Union monitors. 17 And those AU
troops are few, their equip ment limited and their mandate tightly circumscribed to
observe and report on violence, not stop it. 18
¶18 Gerard Prunier in his book Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide writes,
The Darfur horror is still unfolding … Indignation will be voiced and
diplomatic maneuvering will take place while the (Government of Sudan)
will continue to procrastinate, lie and obfuscate in its usual fashion.
Whatever something practical will be attempted at the international penal
level remains to be seen. And the UN and the AU will continue to be
shock-absorbers between the raw African reality and the international
community dreamworld. 19
Isn’t it time to leave our dreamworld and address the raw, grim, horrific reality in Darfur?
¶19 Professor Michael Barnett was a political officer at the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations during the genocide in Rwanda. As he writes, he watched “politics played
15

See, Main Parties Sign Darfur Accord, BBC News, May 5, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4978668.stm; Robert B. Zoellick, May 5, 2006 briefing on Abuja Peace
Agreement for Darfur, http://khartoum.usembassy.gov/dar_050507.html .. See also, Eric Reeves, Why
Abuja Won’t Save Darfur, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 2006,
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060508&s=reeves051006; International Crisis Group, Darfur’s Fragile
Peace Agreement, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4179&l=1. See also, Sudan: Peace in
Darfur’s Violent Peace, ALLAFRICA.COM, Oct. 3, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200610030613.html,
which discusses ways in which the peace agreement “has exacerbated inter-rebel violence and diminished
chances for stability.”
16
See S.C. Res. 1713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1713 (Sept. 29, 2006); S.C. Res. 1709, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1709
(Sept. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); S. C. Res. 1679, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006); S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006); S.C. Res. 1665, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1665 (Mar. 29, 2006); S.C. Res. 1663, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1663 (Mar. 24, 2006); S.C. Res.
1651, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1651 (Dec. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1627, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1627 (Sept. 23, 2005);
S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1591, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29,
2005); S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005); S.C. Res. 1588, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1588
(Mar. 17, 2005); S.C. Res. 1585, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1585 (Mar. 10, 2005); S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004); S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (Jul. 30, 2004).
17
See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, From Cowed to Defiant: Sudan Balks at Taking Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2006, at A8; Noel King, Sudan’s President Lashes Out Against UN, VOA NEWS, Sept. 25, 2006,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/09/mil-060925-voa01.htm; Sudan’s President
Reiterates Full Rejection of UN Resolution 1706, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://english.people.com.cn/200610/02/eng20061002_308118.html; U.S. Implores Allies to Join in
Pressing Sudan on Darfur, VOA NEWS, Sept. 14, 2006, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/200609/2006-09-14-voa74.cfm?CFID=179538792&CFTOKEN=72741679.
18
See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, With Little Authority, African Union Force Struggles With Its Mission in
Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, at A8.
19
PRUNIER, supra note 3, at 159.
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at its cynical finest in the midst of a genocide” as 800,000 Tutsis were slaughtered
in just 100 days by the Hutu. He shares his observations in his book Eyewitness To
A Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. He observes, “[T]he UN preferred
talk to action….Something about the culture at the UN could make nonintervention
not merely pragmatic but also legitimate and proper – even in the face of crimes
against humanity.”20
¶20 Professor Barnett concludes,
When I now think of Rwanda, I imagine not the country but the UN. I
think of diplomats and UN officials hurriedly milling in and out of
Security Council meetings. They are reciting their talking points and
proclaiming, in the UN’s location, that they ‘remain actively seized of the
matter.’ And they deliver only rhetoric in the hope that rhetoric represents
its own consolation. 21
¶21 For the victims of the vicious violence and neglect in Darfur, rhetoric is no
consolation. Rhetoric does not provide food, medicine or firewood for the 2.5
million people driven from their homes, now living in grave conditions. Rhetoric
provides little comfort to the loved ones of the nearly 400,000 who have died due
to this genocide in slow motion, to the countless women and girls who have been
raped and branded, or to those tortured, tormented and traumatized by other horrific
atrocities. Rhetoric provides no protection against Khartoum’s attack helicopters
nor Janjaweed on camel and horseback. No, the time for rhetoric and friendly
persuasion is long over. The time for action is overdue. If not now, when?
¶22 Meanwhile, the violence in Darfur is on the rise and the risk is mounting to a
renewed systematic savage slaughter. Amnesty International just came out with a
report documenting new violence in Darfur that has led to more killings of civilians
and more rapes. 22 United Nations monitors reported that Sudanese military are
“indiscriminately bombing villages” in Darfur, 23 that tribal fighting has worsened
and there are rising reports of deaths from cholera. 24 Earlier this week, African
Union monitors in Sudan reported that Sudan Liberation Army rebels are attacking
20

MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA x-xi (2002).
21
Id.at. xii-xiii; see also Joseph Loconte, The UN’s Masquerade: Human Rights Count For Nothing in
Sudan, NAT’L REV., Sept. 26, 2006.
22
Amnesty International, Sudan: Crying Out for Safety,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR540552006.
23
Jonah Fisher, No End in Sight to Darfur Troubles, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5354836.stm; see also Human Rights Watch, Darfur: Indiscriminate
Bombing Warrants U.N. Sanctions, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/06/sudan14138.htm.
24
Sudan Tribal Fighting Worsens the Security Situation in Sudan’s Troubled Darfur Region, UN NEWS
SERV., Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061002unnews02.htm; see also Paul Reynolds, Despair Over Darfur, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5317796.stm; Jonah Fisher, Dying as Darfur Awaits Peacekeepers, BBC
NEWS, Sept. 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5365770.stm; Darfur Beset by Another Round of
Violent Clashes and Banditry, UN NEWS SERV, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19836&Cr=sudan&Cr1= ; Alfred de Montesquiou,
Sudan, Former Darfur Rebel Faction Clash, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092801089.html; Lydia
Polgreen, Darfur Trembles as Peacekeepers’ Exit Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at A1.
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civilians in southern Darfur. 25 Meanwhile rebels are accusing the Sudanese army of
attacking its headquarters. 26 Reportedly, Khartoum has begun to send out more
than 30,000 troops to the region, allegedly “to stabilize Darfur and protect
civilians.”27 As Congressma n Tom Lantos wrote last month,
Imagine if Hitler had offered to ‘protect’ Europe’s Jews. As a Holocaust
survivor, I cannot imagine a more despicable act than to have Khartoum
send soldiers – who have raped and slaughtered thousands and displaced 2
million people – to ‘protect’ civilians. Evidence is mounting that the
Sudanese government is positioning air and ground forces to complete the
genocide in Darfur that began three years ago. 28
So what should be done? What should the international community do? How should the
United States lead?29
¶23 Last month President Bush appointed a Presidential Envoy for Darfur, former U.S.
AID director Andrew Natsios. Also last month, on the margins of the UN General
Assembly, Mr. Natsios and Assistant Secretary of State Jendhi Frazer convened a
meeting of representatives from 27 countries to explore the ways and means of
ending the death and destruction in Darfur.
¶24 Secretary Rice said in a speech to the African Society last week,

25

African Union: Rebels Attacking Civilians in Southern Darfur, VOA NEWS, Oct. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.eureka-java-gold.com/news/African_Union_Rebels_Attacking_Civi_155846_0_article.html;
Noel King, Violence Continues in Darfur, VOA NEWS, Oct. 3, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-10/2006-10-03voa21.cfm?renderforprint=1&textonly=1&&TEXTMODE=1&CFID=179549375&CFTOKEN=34045919.
26
Darfur Ex-Rebels Blame Sudan Army of Attacking HQ, AFP, Oct. 1, 2006.
27
See EU Concerned Over Renewed Fighting in Darfur, Warns Conflict Could Spread,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 27, 2006; see also, Top U.S. Diplomat in Sudan Says
Government Military Operation in Darfur Violates Peace Agreement, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Sept. 27, 2004.
28
Tom Lantos, Op-Ed, We Must Mobilize Pressure and Fear to Save Darfur, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3a02861c -4cbb-11db-b03c 0000779e2340,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F3a028
61c -4cbb-11db-b03c -0000779e2340.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Flantos.org%2Fagenda-index.html;
see also J. Peter Pham & Michael I. Krauss, Countdown to Genocide: The Final Countdown for Darfur
Looms, TECH CENTRAL STATION, Sept. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in_the_media/in_the_media_show.htm?doc_id=400560.
29
The United States has been a leader on Darfur. In the spring of 2004, President Bush was the first world
leader to call for an end to the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. As U.S. Ambassador to the UN Commission on
Human Rights, that April I tabled a muscular U.S. resolution condemning the violence, demanding it end,
and requiring Khartoum to allow UN observers on the ground. That summer, U.S. Ambassador John
Danforth tabled a tough resolution at the UN Security Council raising the possibility of imposing sanctions
on Khartoum if the violence continued. And on September 23, 2004, in a speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, President Bush became the first world leader to label the carnage in Darfur “genocide.”
The United States has been the world’s most generous nation giving over $1.6 billion in humanitarian aid
to the region and logistical support to the African Union peacekeepers.
Last March President Bush expressed support for NATO involvement in Darfur to end the suffering. The Abuja
peace agreement in May was midwifed by the African Union but signed only after the active personal intervention of
Deputy Secretary Bob Zoellick. And in September, 2006, Congress passed The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
imposing sanctions against Khartoum.
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We have come to a moment of great consequence in Darfur. The
Government of Sudan has launched a new military offensive. The security
situation is clearly deteriorating. Innocent people are suffering and dying.
The humanitarian situation, already tenuous, is at risk of grave worsening.
And the hope of peace is now in danger of collapsing altogether. 30 And
then, this past Monday, October 2nd, in the face of continued obstruction
from Khartoum, President Bush said “the world has a responsibility to
respond” to the genocide in Darfur and that “(t)he United Nations should
not wait any longer to approve a blue-helmeted force -- a UN force of
peacekeepers to protect the innocent people. 31
¶25 Meanwhile, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso traveled to
Addis Ababa this week and spoke about the tragedy in Darfur. He said, “What we
want first of all is to avoid … a Rwanda syndrome where the international
community goes out and does not fulfill its responsibility … We support a stronger
humanitarian and security presence in Darfur … to avoid a tragedy.”32
¶26 There are a series of steps that can and should be taken to stop the mayhem in
Darfur.
¶27 First, humanitarian assistance should increase. The conditions for the 2.5 million
people driven into IDP and refugee camps are grave. 33 As violence increases in
Darfur this critical situation will become even more acute. Just this past week the
European Union announced it is increasing its humanitarian contribution to Darfur
by 40 million Euros. 34 The United States has been the most generous country,
having given $1.6 billion in humanitarian assistance to the refugees and logistical
support to the A.U. peacekeepers. Private charities and NGOs also have played a
large role. But more is needed and more must be provided.
¶28 Second, the UN Security Council should freeze the assets and commercial activities
of Sudan’s leadership and rebel leaders. 35 Also a travel ban on these people should
be imposed. If the Security Council will not take this step, the United States and
the European Union should impose such sanctions. And in America, public
pension funds should be encouraged to divest from companies whose business in
Sudan support the genocide.

30

U.S. State Department, Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s Address to the African Society of the National
Summit on Africa, Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73259.htm.
Then, on October 3, 2006, in a press conference in Cairo, Secretary Rice said, “The international
community does have a responsibility to protect the most vulnerable. What is going on in Darfur now
cannot be tolerated.” U.S. State Department, Secretary Condoleeza Rice’s Remarks With Egyptian Foreign
Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit After Their Meeting, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73525.htm.
31
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Bush Says U.N. Should Wait No Longer Before Intervening in Darfur,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/02/america/NA_GEN_US_Sudan_Darfur.php.
32
EC Warns of Rwanda Syndrome, SA, Oct. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_2007072,00.html.
33
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 24.
34
See EU to Increase Darfur Contribution to 480 Euro, SUDAN TIMES , Oct. 3, 2006,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article17922.
35
See, e.g., Nick Grono & John Prendergast, To Halt Sudan’s Atrocities, Follow the Money, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 22, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/21/opinion/edgrono.php.
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¶29 Third, NATO and the United States should help the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno
Ocampo, through satellite surveillance and other means, in his continuing work to
acquire evidence of the atrocities for later prosecutions. 36
¶30 Fourth, NATO should provide logistical support for peacekeepers – African Union,
UN or otherwise. And NATO should enforce a no-fly zone over Darfur.
Khartoum’s jets and attack helicopters must be grounded.
¶31 Fifth, the international community can no longer allow the thugs in Khartoum to
prevent deployment of a muscular international peacekeeping force in Darfur. We
need boots on the ground. The United States should seek a Chapter VII resolution
in the UN Security Council that would authorize peacekeepers with or without
acquiescence from Khartoum. 37 We should not cower under the threat of a Chinese
or Russian veto of such a resolution. 38 Flush them out. Force them to take an
unequivocal public stand: do they hold more precious their oil supply and military
equipment sales or the lives of innocent people? Make them pay a political price
for any protection they give Khartoum. And if such a resolution is vetoed, the
United States and its allies should be prepared to act without the UN’s blessing as
happened to end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. 39 Perhaps under NATO
auspices, or better yet with authorization from both NATO and the African Union,
action could be taken.
¶32
The Holocaust. The Cambodian Killing Fields. Rwanda. Bosnia. Kosovo. Now
Darfur. Once more the pledge of “Never Again” rings hollow. The scars run deep.
The tragedy in Darfur continues. The human suffering is incomprehensible. It can
be stopped. It must be. The innocent people of Darfur deserve it. Our common
humanity demands it.

36

On March 31, 2005, the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); see also EU
Foreign Ministers Warn Over Darfur War Crimes, IRELAND ON-LINE, Sept. 15, 2006,
http://www.breakingnews.ie/2006/09/15/story276939.html; John McCain & Bob Dole, Rescue Darfur
Now, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 10, 2006, at B7.
37
Nigeria, Tanzania and Bangladesh have pledged infantry soldiers for a UN Peacekeeping Operation in
Darfur. Norway has offered 250 logistical experts, and Sweden has pledged a battalion on engineers . See
UN Gets Offers of Troops for Darfur, THE HINDU, Sept. 27, 2006,
http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/27/stories/2006092704501600.htm.
38
China receives 7 percent of its oil from Sudan. Russia has substantial sales of military equipment to
Khartoum.
39
In 1999, Serbia was involved in the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. Russia announced its
intention to veto a UNSC resolution authorizing force to stop the killing. Under NATO auspices, the
United States and Europe engaged in a military campaign of bombing Serbian targets until Slobodan
Milosevic stopped the carnage.
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